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If the regime described here and the persons who support it are so
prescribed by deep and pervasive definitions, how is one to resist it?
The first step is to achieve a "consciousness" that sees the necessity
for resistance; the second is to find ways in which the "seeing"
produced by such consciousness is sustained, thus preserving the original
act of resisting (seeing). But even more important is to relinquish the
sometimes nostalgic notion of overtaking the regime against which one is
attempting to resist. Such attempts are full of tragic flaws that initiate
a preponderance of circumstances that subvert original intentions while
leaving pervasive structural formations in place. I do not speak here of
"turning the other cheek," but of the reformation of a formal and functional
identity that resists being struck in the first place. Such an identity
does not have to be constructed: it must be found, because in many ways
it exists already—always, right here and right now.
I spoke earlier of the construction of race terminologies that are themselves evidence that a struggle is present. To speak of domination in terms of a normative regime without speaking explicitly of the struggle and contradictions that evolve to this day from domination is to deny that such domination or problems exist. The first strategy of the regime is to deny that there is a problem or, more appropriately, to prevent a problem from being given its proper definition. Without a definition formulated from the regime's interior, there can be no acknowledgment that other problems or realities exist. Two strategies can be employed to gain the acknowledgment of definition from the core mind of the regime. The first is to appeal to whatever structures the regime. A problem can be recognized by the regime if it is formulated as a living contradiction to the formal structures that define the regime. Such formulated contradictions rattle the regime because, in effect, the regime truly believes the messages it constructs and deploys. The most substantive example of such a contradiction was that of the conception of slavery embedded within the moral construct of democracy—a democracy in which every human being is free. The concept that freed the slaves was not necessarily that of "freedom," but could arguably have been the social arguments that disproved that Negroes were less than men. Once this definition was won, the regime's core mind could do nothing but comply with its own system of beliefs and procedures, bringing reality back into alignment. Of course such procedures and the reformation of definitions that make them necessary are not constructed and deployed overnight, and it may take many centuries and lives before the "concept" of freedom can be spoken without calling up its ironic subtext. However, rather than being an arbitrary result, the "calling up" could be used as a defined tactic useful in purging the regime of such paradoxes. The second strategy for gaining the acknowledgment of definitions from the regime is by the use of force. Again the, core mind of the regime is a great strategist and is quite cunning in its conceptualizations of reality; it uses violence against others to substantiate and legitimize these realities. Conversely, violence not authorized by the core mind is seen as illegitimate and "wrong." In any case, this violence may not threaten the regime in any physical sense but, more important, it slashes the veil of reality maintained by the regime's moral and legitimizing structures. Violence, or mere allusions to it, are evidence of a contradiction that the core mind is not able to tolerate. It must construct resolving procedures that at least appear to bring "reality" back into equilibrium. These procedures may be characterized as being violent and legitimized by claims of securing "reality"—a reality that is in fact merely the ideology of the regime. Once this exchange is understood (misunderstood) by the agents of the regime, it is possible to carry out any number of violent acts that are defined as virtuous. Violence carried out against factions defined within the regime may be legitimized by calls for "law and order," while violent acts waged on enemies outside the regime may be legitimized, for example, by "making the world safe for democracy." Regardless of the circumstance, the regime supplies and interprets the definitions. In terms of either of these strategies, the fact remains that definitions must be sought and achieved by way of the present power structure. If this power structure is democratic and the factions within it are all subjected to the same moral configurations, it is quite improbable that a prolonged—let alone successful—"revolution" will result. Revolution within moral legitimizing structures defined as democracy is also improbable because (1) the opposing factions cannot be defined absolutely, and (2) an ultimate source of power cannot be located. In either case—appealing to existing moral/ethical structures or using force—the production of acknowledgment alters in some way the opposing faction. In the first case, the molding of unidentified entities into recognizable types will produce persons who believe in the predominant moral/ethical structure that bound their predecessors in the first place, and they will find themselves, ultimately, participating willingly in such practices. In the second case, there is a risk of annihilation in going up against a complex and organized regime. Therefore, the question remains as to how one is to engage and subdue a regime whose only method of dealing with the unidentifiable is, ultimately, subjugation. The answer is that one must present deep and vast contradictions to the core mind by using existing definitions already recognized by the regime rather than producing new social constructs—which are indeed not really new. The major difference with this particular approach is that it is a functional, rather than formal, strategy that accepts the difficult complexities resulting from the so-called construction of identities. This strategy accepts first and foremost that acknowledgment by the regime is equal to concealment by the regime. Therefore, the course of action that must be pursued is based on identifying existing and concealed identities rather than constructing identities that will, in due time, be concealed. Such a strategy, while accepting certain formal tools present within the regime, must also reuse these tools in a manner that condones as well as contradicts the regime. To accept this strategy is to accept that nothing exists outside the "room" housing the regime and the agent that wishes to resist. Therefore, the unidentifiable identity is so because it is concealed rather than foreign—in fact it exists at the very center of the core mind. |